German arms production

German arms production in WW2 from 1939-1945.

assembly line of German Focke-Wulf Fw 190
A WW2 assembly line of German Focke-Wulf Fw 190 single-seat fighters.

German arms production in WW2

German armaments production during World War II (1939-1945) was a crucial aspect of Nazi Germany’s war effort.

Overview

Initial state: At the outbreak of WWII, Germany was not prepared for a prolonged conflict. The economy was not on a total war footing until later in the war.

Expansion and peak: German armaments production increased significantly from 1941 to 1944. Peak production was reached in 1944, despite Allied bombing campaigns.

Key figures: Albert Speer became Minister of Armaments in 1942, greatly improving production efficiency. Fritz Todt was his predecessor and initiated some early reforms.

Major categories of production:
– Aircraft: Fighters, bombers, and transport planes
Tanks and armored vehicles
Artillery and small arms
– Submarines (U-boats)
Ammunition and explosives

Notable achievements: Development of advanced weapons like the Me 262 jet fighter and V-2 rocket. Mass production of effective weapons like the Panther tank and Tiger tank.

Challenges:
– Raw material shortages, especially oil and rare metals
– Manpower shortages due to military conscription
– Allied strategic bombing campaigns
– Inefficiencies in the Nazi bureaucratic system

Forced labor: Extensive use of forced labor from occupied territories and concentration camps.

Technology and innovation: Germany made significant technological advancements in various fields. Some projects, like nuclear weapons research, were not fully realized.

Decentralization: Later in the war, production was dispersed to avoid Allied bombing. Underground facilities were increasingly used.

End of production:
Armaments production began to decline rapidly in late 1944 and early 1945. Collapse of transportation networks and loss of industrial areas contributed to this decline.


Despite impressive production figures and technological innovations, German armaments production ultimately could not match the combined industrial might of the Allies, particularly the United States and Soviet Union.

The development of the German arms industry during World War II

Hitler speaks in front of armor workers.
Hitler speaks in front of armaments workers.

The surprisingly quickly gained ‘Blitz’ (lightning) victories in the years 1939 to 1940, as well as the initial great successes with the Operation Barbarossa, evidently proved the correctness of the ‘Blitzkrieg’ (lightning war) strategy.
Thus, on July 14, 1941, Hitler announced a disarming and conversion program for the German arms production, 1941, for the reason that ‘in the final battle, no new great opponent could be formed anymore’.

Thus, in 1941, the German armaments’ production remained at the same relatively low level in the actual year of the decision of WW2, while Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and America increased considerably.
Up to now arms production in Germany was carried out in the course of the war according to the same scheme: the German workers manufactured the armaments, were subsequently conscripted and used these self-made weapons. Once the campaign had been successfully completed, the bulk of the army was released back into the factories to produce new armaments.

However, as early as the autumn of 1941, it became clear that the victory over Russia was not possible anymore this year. This is also recognized by Hitler, but he is not willing to change the priorities for armaments.
On the Russian Front, the new tanks of the Red Army like the T-34 and KV-1, which are now emerging in ever-increasing numbers, are growing the difficulties. The German standard anti-tank gun 3.7-cm PAK 36 is not effective against it, and even the strongest German tank, the Panzer IV with the short 7.5 cm cannon, is also weaker.

This raises considerable problems for the German arms production, which are further increased by the rivalries inside the Wehrmacht. In March 1940, a Reichs Ministry for armament and ammunition under the Major-General of the Luftwaffe, Dr Fritz Todt was created. Todt, with his ‘Organization Todt’, had already organized the building of the ‘Reichsautobahnen’ (highways) and of the ‘Westwall’ (Siegfried line) and was responsible also to build the new ‘Atlantikwall’ (Atlantic wall), but his successes in the arms production are rather modest.

On February 8, 1942 Todt had a meeting with Hitler in Rastenburg (East Prussia) about the confused armament situation. A few hours later his plane crashes for unexplained reasons and Hitler’s young chief architect, Speer, is immediately appointed as successor.
Speer immediately recognizes that Hitler wants to maintain a sort of ‘pseudo-peace’ for Germany, and thus, for example, is against the use of women as workers in the industry. Obviously, Hitler had a pathological fear of a loss of popularity and wanted to avoid unrest, strikes and possible revolts or insurrections under all circumstances from the experiences of World War One.

There is also no parent control of armaments priorities between the army, the air force, Kriegsmarine (navy) as well as the new rising Waffen-SS. A development stop for the air force was already decided in 1941, since the war was regarded as won and no new and better aircraft models were needed.

All this can be solved by Speer, and he reaches a much larger German armament production until 1944, but he can no longer catch up with the lost time. If the armaments of 1944 had been available two or three years earlier, it would have been sufficient to win the war, but at that time Hitler’s enemies had, in spite of all, a powerful and oppressive predominance.


German arms production by weapon types

The annual German armaments and military equipment production (excluding ammunition) and a comparison of the necessary strategic raw materials. Additional, the origins of the strategic raw materials and effect of the Allied bombing offensive on the German arms production.

Vehicles and transportation:

Type of Weapon
1939
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945 (2-3 months)
Overall
Battle tanks
962
1,573
3,399
4,386
5,813
7,983
956
25,072
Flamethrower tanks
-
87
47
81
110
20
-
345
Armored command vehicles
44
34
132
131
134
41
-
516
Tank destroyers
-
-
-
-
90
3,280
1,750
5,120
Assault guns
-
184
548
789
3,279
5,172
988
10,960
Self-propelled anti-tank guns
-
173
214
1,222
1,695
457
16
3,777
Assault artillery
-
-
-
34
304
1,227
112
1,677
Self-propelled artillery
-
40
16
183
1,362
670
87
2,358
Armored anti-aircraft guns
15
-
-
-
87
361
64
527
Reconnaissance vehicles
324
422
618
992
867
555
113
3,024
other armored vehicles
55
334
605
45
310
959
142
2,450
Demolition vehicles (Goliath aso)
100
-
-
1,088
4,494
3,102
138
8,922
Armored personnel carriers
232
337
813
2,574
7,153
9,486
1,285
21,880
Semi-tracked tractors
?
3,224
7,489
7,627
9,827
7,840
696
36,703+
Semi-tracked trucks
-
-
-
10,704
37,427
27,761
724
87,329
Military trucks and lorries
32,558
53,348
51,085
49,707
52,896
103,314
4,582
347,490
Military cars
?
?
?
24,152
105,693
96,492
?
226,337+
Military motor-cycles
?
?
?
34,017
33,046
27,830
2,577
97,470+
Locomotives
?
1,688
1,918
2,637
5,243
3,495
?
14,981+
Train wagons
?
28,200
44,845
60,892
66,263
45,189
?
245,389+

Not only the numbers were increased dramatically between 1942 and 1944, also the quality and combat effectiveness were partially strong increased, as – for example – the combat weights of the produced armored vehicles reflecting this fact:

Combat weights of the produced armored vehicles:

Year:
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
Numbers
2,154
5,138
9,278
19,824
27,340
Combat weight in tons
37,325
83,188
140,454
369,416
622,322
Average combat weight per unit
17.3
16.2
15.1
18.6
22.8

t_arrow1 see also: German AFV production (in detail).

Infantry weapons:

Type of Weapon
1939
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945 (2-3 months)
Overall
Pistols
?
?
?
467,253
959,540
1,038,340
145,140
2,610,273+
Rifles (K98k, K41, K43, G 33/40)
?
1,371,700
1,358,500
1,149,593
1,946,200
2,282,380
310,118
8,418,491+
Machine-guns
?
170,880 (incl SMG)
324,800 (incl SMG)
77,340
165,527
278,164
56,089
c. 674,280
Sub-machine guns MP 38, 40, 44
?
(in MG)
(in MG)
152,683
240,073
500,074
131,672
c. 1,400,000+
Anti-tank hand-weapons (up to Dec 42 Pz.B. 38,39,41 - from Aug 43 Panzerschreck)
?
?
?
880
50,835
209,000
21,000
281.715+
Panzerfaust (anti-tank hand weapon)
-
-
-
-
c.500,000
2,870,000 (only Oct-Dec), 1,500,000 or more before
2,056,000
c.7,000,000+
Mortars
?
4,380
4,230
18,551
25,955
29,598
3,675
86,389+

Artillery and guns:

Type of Weapon
1939
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945 (2-3 months)
Overall
Artillery guns of all types
1,214
6,730
11,200
(details below)
(details below)
(details below)
(details below)
159,144+
Light anti-tank guns (3.7-cm-PAK, 4.2-cm-PAK, Pak38)
(see art)
(see art)
(see art)
4,798
2,481
-
-
(see art)
Medium anti-tank guns (7.5-cm-PAK 38, 40, 41, 7.62-cm PAK (r) )
(see art)
(see art)
(see art)
4,344
12,400
12,151
618
(see art)
Heavy anti-tank guns (8.8-cm-PAK, 12-cm-PAK)
-
-
-
-
1,224
2,058
367
(see art)
Light anti-aircraft guns
(see art)
(see art)
(see art)
15,527
19,602
16,863+
1,771+
(see art)
Heavy anti-aircraft guns
(see art)
(see art)
(see art)
1,028
6,138
7,714+
?
(see art)
(see art)
(see art)
(see art)
1,687
2,802
6,458
876
(see art)
Nebelwerfer (rocket launcher)
(see art)
(see art)
(see art)
3,864
1,706
3,767
460
(see art)
Light art (mainly 10.5 cm)
(see art)
(see art)
(see art)
1,476
4,533
9,000
604
(see art)
Heavy art (10-cm K18, sFH, 17-cm-K)
(see art)
(see art)
(see art)
931
1,773
3,652
475
(see art)
Super-heavy art (21-cm-K, 20.3-cm-K, 24-cm H, K3, K5, K38, E, M1)
(see art)
(see art)
(see art)
33
123
125
61
(see art)

Planes:

Type of Weapon
1939
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945 (2-3 months)
Overall
Bomber planes
737
2,852
3,373
4,337
4,649
2,287
-
18,235
Fighter planes
605
2,746
3,744
5,515
10,898
25,285
4,935
53,728
Ground attack planes
134
603
507
1,249
3,266
5,496
1,104
12,359
Reconnaissance planes
163
971
1,079
1,067
1,117
1,686
216
6,299
Seaplanes, floatplane
100
269
183
238
259
141
-
1,190
Transport planes
145
388
502
573
1,028
443
-
3,079
Gliders
-
378
1,461
745
442
111
8
3,145
Communication planes
46
170
431
607
874
410
11
2,549
Trainers
588
1,870
1,121
1,078
2,274
3,693
318
10,942
Jet fighters
-
-
-
-
-
564
929
1,493
Jet bombers
-
-
-
-
-
150
64
214
Fi 103 flying bomb (V-1)
-
-
-
-
-
23,672
6,509
30,181
A-4 rocket (V-2)
-
-
-
-
-
4,128
1,669
5,797

Ships:

Type of Weapon
1939
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945 (2-3 months)
Overall
U-boats
58
50
219
222
292
283
98
1,220
Battleships
-
1
1
-
-
-
-
2
Destroyers
-
2
5
3
6
2
-
18
Torpedo boats
?
?
6
6
6
6
-
24+
MTB's
?
?
36
36
41
63
-
176+

It is noteworthy that the significant increase in arms production between 1942 and 1944 (over 300%) was made possible without access to more resources. It was especially done through much greater productivity and stripping out the civilian industrial sector. Therefore the following overview:

Annual strategic raw material production (m. metric tons):

Year:
1939
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
Coal
332.8
364.8
402.8
407.8
429.0
432.8
50.3
Ore
18.5
29.5
53.3
50.6
56.2
32.6
?
Steel
23.7
21.5
28.2
28.7
30.6
25.8
1.4
Aluminum (in 1,000 metric tons - especially important for aircraft production)
239.4
265.3
315.6
420.0
432.0
470.0
?

Important influences on Germany’s military production

destroyed Krupp armaments works in Essen
A part of the plant of the Krupp armaments works in Essen after the RAF bombing raids. Apart from the large chimney’s is virtuall nothing undestroyed anymore.

Several factors had an important influence on the ability of Germany to produce armaments, munitions and military equipment during World War 2.
This includes the dependence on raw materials from the occupied and conquered territories or it’s import from neutral countries. Similarly, the Allied bombing offensive resulted in significant losses and forced a costly relocation of production facilities.

The importance of occupied and neutral countries for strategic raw materials for Germany:

Monthly average in 1,000 tonnes for 1943:

selected, important strategic raw materials
Greater Germany
Occupied Territories
Overall
Proportion of the occupied territories in %
Iron ore (particularly from France and Belgium)
950.0
437.0
1,387.0
31.5 %
Coal
23,200.0
6,400.0
29,600.0
21.6 %
Crude steel (mainly from France)
2,550.0
337.0
2,887.0
11.7 %
Aluminium
20.8
9.7
30.5
31.8 %
Pulp
5.3
14.5
19.8
73.2 %
Total
26,726.1
7,198.2
33,924.3
21.2 %

Importance of manganese ore from Ukraine 1941-1943 (in 1,000 tonnes manganese content):

selected, important strategic raw materials
Greater Germany
Occupied Territories
Overall
Proportion of the occupied territories in %
Iron ore (particularly from France and Belgium)
950.0
437.0
1,387.0
31.5 %
Coal
23,200.0
6,400.0
29,600.0
21.6 %
Crude steel (mainly from France)
2,550.0
337.0
2,887.0
11.7 %
Aluminum
20.8
9.7
30.5
31.8 %
Pulp
5.3
14.5
19.8
73.2 %
Total
26,726.1
7,198.2
33,924.3
21.2 %

Important raw material imports from neutral countries 1942-1944:

Country
raw material
1942
1943
1944
Sweden
Iron ore (in 1,000 tons)
8,000
10,300 (=38%)
4,500
Pulp (in 1,000 tons)
174
150
110
Portugal
Tin ore (in tonnes)
649
1,236
?
Tungsten ore (in tonnes)
611
463
895
Turkey
Chrome ore (in tonnes)
-
4,950
11,700

These tables are showing, for example, that such an important strategic raw material like iron ore (for steel production) in 1943 was coming by 42% from Greater Germany, 38% were imported from Sweden and 20% were delivered by the occupied territories.


Failures in arms production as results of the Allied bombing offensive:

Underground production plant
With enormous efforts were production plants outscoured from the Allied bombing offensive and shifted under the earth – or at least decentralized in remote and distant areas. In this way it was possible to triple the arms production between 1942 to 1944, despite the more than 16-fold increase of the bombs which were dropped in this time.

Selection of the period from October to December 1943:

Weapon
Manufacturing
Failure
Overall
Proportion of failure in %
909
177
1,086
16.3 %
776
144
920
15.6 %
173
79
252
31.4 %
Semi-tracked carriers
457
210
667
31.5 %
7.5-cm Pak 40
645
55
700
7.9 %
8.8-cm-Pak 43/41
117
63
180
35.0 %
light FH 18/40 gun
268
32
300
10.7 %
heavy 10-cm gun 18
26
19
45
42.2 %
Trucks
11,373
2,257
13,630
16.6 %
Overall
14,744
3,036
17,780
17.1 %

Selection of Germany cities, based on the few effective and most ineffective bombing attacks in the view of loss of production:

City
first 500t attack
total dropped bombs in tons
Population 1939
Population share of Germany
Value of the industrial production in 1000 RM (c.$450)
Share of industrial production of Germany
Total production failure in months
Failure based on the total production of whole Germany
Wuppertal
29.05.1943
5,883
401,672
0.50 %
77,242
0.82 %
4.4
0.30
Düsseldorf
31.07.1942
24,000
726,261
0.91 %
153,262
1.63 %
2.2
0.30
Dortmund
04.05.1943
17,538
542,261
0.68 %
84,866
0.90 %
3.4
0.26
Bochum
13.05.1943
11,175
305,495
0.38 %
84,820
0.90 %
2.8
0.21
Bremen
22.06.1942
13,890
450,084
0.56 %
114,132
1.22 %
1.9
0.20
Leipzig
20.10.1943
4,764
831,615
1.07 %
157,822
1.68 %
1.2
0.17
Oberhausen
14.06.1943
3,067
191,842
0.24 %
47,785
0.51 %
2.0
0.09
Hagen
01.10.1943
4,502
151,760
0.19 %
32,082
0.34 %
0.6
0.02
for comparison:
Berlin
01.03.1943
35,000
4,338,756
5.46 %
717,251
7.41 %
irrelevant
irrelevant
Stuttgart
11.03.1943
20,822
458,429
0.57 %
176,790
1.84 %
irrelevant
irrelevant
Munich
09.03.1944
16,666
893,954 "1.12 %"
161,865
1.72 %
irrelevant
irrelevant
Cologne
31.05.1942
30,679
887,724
1.11 %
132,600
1.41 %
irrelevant
irrelevant
Essen
03.04.1943
31,146
666,743
0.83 %
113,512
1.21 %
irrelevant
irrelevant
Gelsen-kirchen
25.06.1943
8,035
317,568
0.40 %
88,667
0.95 %
irrelevant
irrelevant

Progress of the bombing war 1940-1945 (in tons of bombs dropped):

Year:
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945 (4 months)
total (projected 1945 to a full year)
on cities in Germany
10,000 = 0.4 %
30,000 = 1.3 %
40,000 = 1.7 %
120,000 = 5.1 %
650,000 = 27.7 %
500,000 (1,500,000 projected for the year) = 63.8 %
2,350,000 (actual 1,350,000)
for comparison; on cities in UK
38,844
21,858
3,260
2,298
9,151
761 (2,283 projected for the year)
77,694 (actual 76,172)


References and literature

Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg (10 Bände, Zentrum für Militärgeschichte)
World War II – A Statistical Survey (John Ellis)
Illustrierte Geschichte des Dritte Reiches (Kurt Zentner)
Chronology of World War II (Christopher Argyle)
German Aircraft of World War 2 in Colour (Kenneth Munson)
Encyclopedia of German Tanks of World War Two (P.Chamberlain, H.L.Doyle)
Kraftfahrzeuge und Panzer der Reichswehr, Wehrmacht und Bundeswehr (Werner Oswald)

15 thoughts on “German arms production”

  1. The RAF Bomber Command was obsessed with bombing cities in order to de-house the working population, in the belief that they would then not turn up for work at the factories.

    This proved to be a mistaken idea but was continued right up to wars end with Dresden in 1945 being a prime example of that idea.

    Although the US Airforce did join in some of this city bombing, they quickly realised that it was German infrastructure that was the key bottleneck, so they concentrated on oil, communications, engineering and aircraft production, with good results.

    So it was the USAAF bombers that did the most damage to the German war industry with the RAF bombers, despite their huge losses, just rally making brick rubble.

    A simplistic view I know, but largely true.

  2. Does anyone know if Germany was capable of mass producing the cannon shell required by the Luftwaffe at The Battle Of Britain. I’ve heard a claim the cannon shell they needed were supplied to them by neutral countries.

    1. I think you are perhaps axis States mixed up, Japan had problems sourcing the electrically fired ammo for their German made 20mm Mauser cannon, I don’t think Germany would have had any problems sorting ammo for their own equipment as they had even started manufacturing ammo for the British 3.7inch AA guns which they captured 1940 in large numbers from the BEF

  3. Fernando Navarro Robuschi

    Hi! I wanted to ask you about a common myth, which states Germany had very poor logistics to supply its troops on the Eastern Front, and that that doomed it to inevitably fail in the eastern front. I don’t deny the first part, of course (incompatible railway tracks, vast distances, partisan activity, poor-maintained roads, etc.) but the second part is jus a myth, right? I mean, logistics alone could no have possibly bring victory to the USSR…

  4. Much of what was left of the vaunted Luftwaffe was defending the skies over German cities, or flying missions on the Eastern Front… seems odd we don’t hear more of the air war in the East after Stalingrad…

  5. According to Adam Tooze, The Wages of Destruction (2006): “On the eve of war 14.6 million German women were working, with 51% of women of working age (16–60 years old) in the workforce. Nearly six million were doing farm work, as Germany’s agricultural economy was dominated by small family farms. 2.7 million worked in industry. When the German economy was mobilized for war it paradoxically led to a drop in female work participation, reaching a low of 41% before gradually climbing back to over 50% again. This still compares favorably with the UK and the US, both playing catchup, with Britain achieving a participation rate of 41% of women of working age in 1944. However, in terms of women employed in war work, British and German female participation rates were nearly equal by 1944, with the United States still lagging.” This idea of Hitler being against women in the workforce, isn’t supported by the reality of what happened.

  6. two uncles taken from the Netherlands to work in a German armaments factory. Often had labour disruptions and workers were punished for this. What aws the name od this factory and where was it located. Thanks.

    1. Yet it is when the bombing really got started. Check Richard Overy’s The Bombing War to understand how ineffective strategic bombing was, yet very costly for the Allies.

      1. Richard Overy pretty much claims that the Bombinb campaign was effectice. He says it in the exact same book your mentioned.

  7. Phillips Payson O’Brien is his book “How The War Was Won” is suggesting that at least 55% but even 60% of German war production was targetting air warfare, 12-13% sea warfare and only about 30% of munitions went on land warfare. With all efforts including V-weapons, concreat sheltet construction because allied strategic bombing that share of air war might have been bigger than 60%.

  8. Hello!

    Interesting data set but what is the source of this material; figures etc?

    In addition would you know where I could find an allied POW chart showing total number of allied captured by Germany and allies?

    Cheers!

    1. Hi !
      All data here are used to develop realistic War Games (means the outcome most be the same thna in history if every decision taken by the opponents is the same).
      So from a lot of sources the ‘strong’, safe, confirmed and true datas to reaxh this goal are used and it’s impossible to mention all of them here.

Leave a Comment

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

This site uses Akismet to reduce spam. Learn how your comment data is processed.

WW2 Weapons
Scroll to Top
Conflict of Nations - World War III