Production and losses of tanks

Soviet and German production and losses of tanks on the Russian Front from 1941 to 1945 and could the Red Army have won the war alone ?

back to Part I: Russian vs German AFVs in WW II

Could the Red Army have won the war alone?

Short answer: highly unlikely—but it depends on what you mean by “on its own.”

If that means without any involvement from the Western Allies—no D-Day, no bombing campaign, no Lend-Lease aid—then the Red Army might still have been able to defeat Germany eventually, though at a far higher cost, over a longer period of time, and with a less certain outcome—a stalemate due to attrition would certainly have been a possible scenario.

Here is the reason:

What the USSR could achieve on its own
The Soviet Union bore the brunt of the war in Europe. Around 70–80% of German military losses occurred on the Eastern Front. By 1943–44, after Stalingrad and Kursk, the Red Army had seized the initiative and was pushing westward with massive troop strength, industrial production (which had largely been relocated east of the Urals), and growing operational competence. Germany was already overwhelmed.

In terms of manpower, territory, and the willingness to accept losses, the USSR thus had the capacity to wear Germany down.

What “alone” would have been enough
This is where it gets tricky. The Western Allies played an important role in several respects:

– Lend-Lease aid: The USSR received huge quantities of trucks, locomotives, food, radio equipment, raw materials, and fuel additives. The Soviet offensives were heavily dependent on this logistical base—especially the trucks. Without them, the advances would have been slower and less coordinated.

– Second Front (D-Day): Starting in 1944, Germany also had to wage a major war in the West. This divided its forces, resources, and attention.

– Strategic Bombing: Allied bombing campaigns crippled German industry, oil production, and transportation networks. This weakened the Wehrmacht even before the Soviet offensives had begun.

Without these factors, Germany could have concentrated far more forces on the Eastern Front, which might have significantly prolonged the war.

So what is likely to change?
– The war in Europe would likely last longer—possibly until 1946 or beyond—and could have ended in an exhausting stalemate.
– Soviet losses (which are already enormous) would rise even further, and it would be questionable whether they could have sustained the effort in the long run.
– Soviet advances would be slower and more grueling
– Germany might have been able to stabilize the fronts for longer, particularly in 1943–44

Yet Germany still faced fundamental problems: limited oil reserves, overburdened logistics, and a two-front mentality even before D-Day. The Soviet Union possessed depth, manpower, and growing industrial dominance.

Conclusion
– Could the Red Army have won the war on its own? Possibly yes—but not quickly and not without high costs.
– Was the support of the Western Allies decisive? It did not win the war on its own, but it significantly shortened it and reduced the costs—especially for the USSR.

The problem of heavy losses

If the Western Allies would not take into consideration, and the Russians had not received the 11,900 armored vehicles by Lend-Lease, and all German armored vehicles of the Wehrmacht, which had been lost in the West and the South, could have been deployed on the Eastern Front a kill-to-loss ratio of 2.45 to 1 is needed to destroy all 23,300 Russian AFVs on 22 June 1941 plus all 99,150 vehicles built during the war (a total of 122,450 AFVs). This figure is well below the actual ratio of 2.91 to 1 achieved on the Eastern Front during World War II.

This kill-to-loss ratio destroys another recent myth, which has recently come again into fashion, which refers to the situation on the Eastern Front. It is said that the Russians could have won the Second World War without any support from the US or Commonwealth forces, above all because of their large quantity of produced T-34 tanks.

This assertion is untenable, as is shown by the loss ratio – and even before the increased production in Germany had been taken into account, because of the absence of the Allied bombing war. At the same time, the increasing German air superiority on the Eastern Front from 1943 on would have acted, while the Red Army would have been deprived of half of its motorized transport, which consisted of Lend-Lease vehicles.

The 9,000 to 10,000 88mm Flak guns, which would not have been necessary to defend Germany against Allied air raids, could have been used as an effective anti-tank force on the Eastern Front.
In addition, e.g. tor the approximately 1,000 then non-necessary German U-boats, other war materials – such as tanks – could have been produced.

Approx. monthly Production and Losses of Russian and German Armored Vehicles (Germany: only tanks and assault guns, but on all fronts):

German tank production and losses June-December 1941:

About 240 Pzkpfw II, III and IV were lost in North Africa.

see also: Military Performance on the Russian Front

References and literature

Operation Barbarossa: the Complete Organisational and Statistical Analysis, and Military Simulation, Volume I – IIIB (Nigel Askey)
Krieg der Panzer (Piekalkiewicz)
World War II – A Statistical Survey (John Ellis)
Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg (10 Bände, Zentrum für Militärgeschichte)
Kraftfahrzeuge und Panzer der Reichswehr, Wehrmacht und Bundeswehr (Werner Oswald)
Encyclopedia of German Tanks of World War Two (P.Chamberlain, H.L.Doyle)
Soviet Tanks and Combat Vehicles of World War Two (Steven J. Zaloga, James Grandsen)